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The MiFID Revolution 
Jean-Pierre Casey and Karel Lannoo* 
 
he present Policy Brief paints a portrait of the likely EU securities market landscape post-MiFiD. Much of the 
available analysis on MiFID has focused on short-term adjustment and compliance costs, especially regarding IT 
investments. Yet MiFID represents a revolution in European securities markets that is likely to lead to deep and long-
lasting structural changes. The analysis in this Policy Brief concentrates on ten predictions that the authors make about the 
likely impact of MiFID on market structures, and the likely strategic responses of financial services firms.   
 
1. Introduction
* 
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) 
has essentially been seen so far as an IT and compliance 
exercise for financial services firms. As a result, much of 
the analysis surrounding MiFID compliance and the 
development of business strategies for the new regulatory 
landscape have focused on building the supporting IT 
infrastructure and on upgrading systems.   
This paper argues, however, that the impact of MiFID 
extends far beyond mere IT and compliance alone. The 
unprecedented scope of harmonisation of securities 
markets legislation and the resulting open architecture 
ushered in by MiFID, especially in trade execution and 
reporting, will cause a profound upheaval within existing 
market structures.  
MiFID is nothing short of a revolution: it will see banks 
operating as exchanges for some activities, exchanges 
offering alternative execution services that more closely 
resemble the structure of OTC markets than traditional 
organised markets, and the decentralisation of order 
execution among a panoply of venues in markets 
previously governed by concentration rules: le monde à 
l’envers. MiFID will have a profound impact on the 
organisation, day-to-day operations and business strategies 
not only of investment firms – which have tended to be the 
focus thus far – but also of exchanges, asset managers and 
other financial markets intermediaries, such as brokers, 
data consolidators and business solutions providers. 
Overall market design and functioning are likely to be 
heavily impacted, not least because the implementation of 
MiFID is not a static event necessitating only one-off sunk 
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costs; rather, it will require firms to make constant 
dynamic readjustments to remain competitive. 
In light of this reality, it seems that insufficient analysis 
has been devoted to the strategic implications of MiFID, 
even though these will be far-reaching – even more so, we 
believe, than what Basel II represented for banks – because 
of the profound market restructuring that can be expected. 
The accompanying uncertainties as to how market 
participants are to position themselves strategically in the 
new regulatory landscape and respond to newly emerging 
threats will shake up the status quo.  
As with all revolutions, the shock to the status quo will 
represent a profitable opportunity for those who are well-
prepared – and a death sentence for those who cannot 
adapt to the new environment. The well-prepared are the 
actors who in the post-MiFID world will generate higher 
revenue streams, steal market share from the less well-
prepared, and begin to compete in areas lying outside their 
traditional scope of service provision – areas previously 
closed to them, or deemed to be unprofitable prior to 
MiFID. On the other hand, the less well-prepared will be 
startled soon after November 2007 to find themselves 
competing in business lines against actors from whom they 
previously faced little or no competition, including actors 
whom they may not even have viewed as natural 
competitors prior to MiFID.  
2.  10 key predictions on the impact of MiFID 
MiFID will accelerate some important ongoing changes in 
European financial markets that are driven primarily by 
technological improvements and enhanced competition in 
the provision of financial services arising from 
globalisation. Greater recourse to electronic trading, the 
facilitation of straight-through processing, the continued 
disintermediation of brokering through direct market 
access and algorithms and the ‘exchangisation’ of OTC 
markets are but a few examples of ongoing structural shifts 
in financial markets that will be reinforced or precipitated 
by MiFID.   
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MiFID leads to a higher degree of harmonisation for 
investment services and securities transactions in the EU, 
by extending the reach of services and products covered as 
compared to the Investment Services Directive (ISD), and 
by imposing more detailed performance rules on 
exchanges and investment firms. As such, it should lead to 
more integrated European capital markets, but will also 
have significant impacts on market structure and 
development. 
MiFID directly touches four distinct groups of actors 
within the financial services industry: investment firms 
(which may have fairly different organisational models 
across countries), exchanges and quasi-exchanges 
(multilateral trading facilities – MTFs), data vendors and 
specialised IT firms and solution providers, such as third-
party algorithm developers. It affects equity markets, 
commodity and derivatives markets, and to a lesser extent 
bond markets.
1 This represents a considerable upgrade as 
compared to the Investment Services Directive, which it 
replaces. We therefore start our analysis with a discussion 
of the main developments in European capital markets 
over the past decade and review the effects of the ISD. We 
next rehearse the key points of MiFID and discuss the 
issues raised by its implementation for the various markets 
affected. A final section offers a brief outlook for the 
future of European securities markets. While numerous 
papers have already been published on how to prepare for 
MiFID, there has been much less consistent analysis of its 
impact on the market and the industry. 
In our view, MiFID will bring about the following 
fundamental changes: 
1.  As a result of high compliance costs and greater 
operational complexity, MiFID will lead to a further 
consolidation phase in the brokerage industry, 
although smaller firms will continue to have a niche, 
essentially because of the proximity to their clients. 
2.  Although investment firms and MTFs will be able to 
compete with exchanges on order execution as a result 
of the abolition of the concentration rule, exchanges 
are expected to remain the main source of liquidity 
and price formation for the time being, but they will 
be subject to more competition in their trade reporting 
and settlement activities. Despite a misconception that 
they will only face more competition from market-
makers in the trading function, exchanges will also 
face enhanced competition from other exchanges. On 
the post-trading side, exchanges will be impacted by 
the ECB’s Target II initiative and the EU’s Code of 
Conduct. 
 
                                                        
1 Under Art. 65 of MiFID, national regulatory authorities are 
free to extend the strict MiFID pre- and post-trade 
information requirements to non-equity markets. Some 
already do so, such as those in Denmark, owing to the large 
retail investor presence in its mortgage bond market. 
3.  OTC markets are going to be more heavily 
regulated than in the past under MiFID, meaning that 
the heydays of market opacity and cozy execution 
arrangements between providers are over: the distance 
between OTC markets and regulated markets will be 
narrowed as the former become more transparent, 
more competitive and more closely monitored. 
4.  A significant rise in algorithmic trading is almost a 
certainty. The need to rapidly search prices available 
on a variety of execution venues ex-ante and to verify 
the quality of execution ex-post will stimulate demand 
for business solutions such as algorithms. As 
execution venues proliferate, traders will rely more on 
smart order-routing systems to provide best execution. 
5.  Trading volumes should increase as a result of greater 
competition between execution venues and enhanced 
market transparency. More competition means lower 
transaction costs, which should feed into higher 
volumes. More transparency means more confidence 
in the quality of price discovery, enhancing market 
efficiency, which should also generate higher volumes. 
Greater transparency will contribute to the 
parcelisation of block trades into a more continuous 
stream of orders, since it will increase the market 
impact of large trades. 
6.  Connectivity is a central feature of the post-MiFID 
trading landscape that will be characterised by the 
fragmentation of liquidity pools as trading is 
decentralised. Connectivity necessitates the 
acceleration of efforts to arrive at common standards 
to facilitate straight-through processing in an 
accelerated and more competitive trading 
environment, as well as to ensure seamless order 
transmission and data retrieval, across the spectrum of 
business lines in a decentralised trading environment. 
7.  A massive market for market data will arise out of 
MiFID. In countries where the concentration rule was 
applied, the local stock exchange acted as the sole 
execution venue, meaning that market data revenues 
essentially accrued to exchanges. The more execution 
venues there are, the greater is the need to gather data. 
MiFID’s strict best execution and order-handling rules 
heavily increase the need for reliable analysis in both 
the pre- and post-trade periods to ascertain the venues 
that will most likely perform a successful execution 
pre-trade and the self-imposed quality of execution 
tests MiFID requires post-trade.  
8.  MiFID necessitates a response on the part of buy-side 
firms. Most analysis has focused on the impact of 
MiFID on sell-side institutions. The buy side will be 
faced with the challenge of ensuring efficient data 
management, as market data are likely to increase 
significantly post-MiFID. The challenge is to monitor 
the quality of execution buy-side firms obtain for their 
clients. 
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9.  Although MiFID is much more detailed and 
harmonising in scope than its predecessor and the 
European Commission has tried to restrict the 
loopholes in the implementing directive, ‘goldplating’ 
will continue, as suggested by the emergence of initial 
indications in this direction. In addition, contract law 
and consumer protection remain national. The 
European Commission thus faces a heavy policing role 
in the months to come to ensure correct 
implementation, tight enforcement and a level playing 
field. 
10. Given the heavy regime of MiFID, the search for less 
stringent regimes, such as those for investment funds 
(UCITS), can be expected, but also non-passportable 
national regimes may emerge. On the other hand, 
MiFID is so all-encompassing that its rules will spill-
over into related sectors, such as asset management 
under the UCITS regime. 
3.  The ISD and the development of 
European capital markets  
The past decade has seen a sea change in European capital 
markets. From a predominantly bank-dominated system, 
the European financial system has become more market-
based. According to some indicators, it has even recently 
surpassed the US in this respect. For example, leading 
European stock market indexes have become more cyclical 
than those in the US, and both the issuance of corporate 
debt and the number and total value of IPOs (initial public 
offerings) in Europe surpassed those in the US in 2005. 
The change since 1996, when the Investment Services 
Directive came into force, is remarkable. As can be seen 
from the hexagon in Figure 1, bond issuance more than 
doubled, equity market capitalisation tripled and equity 
market turnover and the total amount of derivatives 
contracts written increased six-fold. Figure 2 shows that 
the growth of bank assets has been overtaken by the 
growth in bond assets, which is another sign of the move 
towards a more market-based system. Although the growth 
of the IPO market has benefited from the enforcement of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and from some large-
scale privatisations in the EU in 2005, it is a sign that the 
European regulatory regime is not too burdensome and/or 
that it manages to cope with diversity.  
 
 
Figure 1. EU securities market growth, 1996-2005 
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Figure 2. Growth of bank vs. securities markets in the EU 
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It is difficult to distinguish the extent to which this 
phenomenon is the result of regulatory initiatives, as 
compared to simple market developments. The growth of 
the European financial markets has occurred against a 
backdrop of efforts to create a truly integrated market, and 
has benefited from relatively benign macroeconomic 
conditions at global level. But it is certain that specific 
policy initiatives have contributed to the spectacular 
financial market development in the EU, a fact that has 
probably not been sufficiently emphasised in the political 
discourse. Foremost, in our view, there is a clear positive 
effect of EMU. The introduction of the euro has created a 
much bigger, more liquid and stable currency zone, which 
has created better conditions for issuers and asset 
managers, and has increased competition amongst 
intermediaries. A clear indication is the use of the euro as a 
currency for international bonds: since 2004, the euro has 
overtaken the dollar as the main currency of denomination 
for international debt issues, and it currently accounts for 
about 46% of the total value outstanding of international 
debt securities (as of September 2006). The Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP), launched in 1999, has 
contributed to creating an awareness of the importance of a 
well-functioning single capital market, and measures 
adopted under the plan, which are already in force, such as 
the prospectus directive, have not had a negative impact on 
European capital markets, contrary to some expectations. 
The prospectus directive creates a much more harmonised 
European regime for issues on capital markets, and does 
not exclude domestic, but ‘non-passportable’ regimes, 
such as the Professional Securities Markets (PSM) of the 
London Stock Exchange or Euro-MTF of the Luxembourg 
exchange. 
Moving more specifically to the effects of the ISD, it is 
clear that the free provision of trading screens in the EU 
and the single licence for brokerage services has 
contributed to the reconfiguration and restructuring of 
European securities markets. The former allowed the 
trading activity and liquidity to concentrate on the stock 
exchange of the home market of a listed corporation, and 
thus also improve the price formation process. This is 
apparent from the reduction in the number of foreign 
listings from firms from other EU countries on EU 
exchanges. The single licence for brokers increased the 
competition in securities brokerage services and 
contributed to the consolidation and scale enlargement in 
the sector. Many smaller European brokers have been 
absorbed into larger entities, mostly commercial banks, 
and not many managed to survive as independent entities. 
Ironically, the member state which was the most critical of 
the ISD during the negotiations,
2 the UK, probably 
benefited the most from these effects. Although conduct-
of-business rules were not sufficiently harmonised to allow 
cross-border provision of services for retail clients, this did 
not prevent wholesale markets from integrating and 
investment banks from consolidating their European 
operations in a few financial centres. 
Some of these effects had already started well before the 
ISD came into force. The competition between exchanges 
started with the creation of SEAQ International, a screen-
based quotation system specialising in non-British stocks, 
by the London Stock Exchange in 1985, and the 
deregulation or ‘Big Bang’ of the London market a year 
later. This allowed London to attract many trades in 
continental European stocks. Continental European 
exchanges reacted by improving their auction systems and 
liberalising market access and commissions. 
The downsides of the ISD, however, were the lack of 
harmonisation of conduct of business rules, and the 
privileged status of the exchanges, alias ‘regulated 
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markets’, many of which had in the meantime been 
privatised. This was addressed in the ensuing MiFID. 
4. Implementing  MiFID 
Although the European Commission initially considered 
going for a more limited review of the ISD, it finally chose 
for a fundamental overhaul, which was also related to the 
introduction of the ‘Lamfalussy approach’, which opened 
the way for secondary legislation in EU securities law. But 
the European Commission did not change the basic scope 
of the directive, as regulating brokers and markets. 
The main changes brought about by MiFID are: 
  The harmonisation of conduct of business rules for 
securities trading, including strict rules on best 
execution of trades, client categorisation and client 
reporting;  
  Rules on the internal governance of investment firms, 
requiring them to tackle conflicts of interest, maintain 
good governance and ensure continuity of their 
services; 
  The abolition of the concentration rules of the ISD, by 
which member states could require trades to be 
executed on the main exchange or the ‘regulated 
market’; 
  The much greater possibility for investment firms to 
internalise trades, as ‘systematic internalisers’ for 
retail-market size trades, subject to strict pre- and post- 
trade transparency requirements, or less limited above 
these thresholds; 
  The European passport for Multilateral Trading 
Facilities, which can be created by investment firms 
and exchanges;  
  The extension of the single passport regime to some 
other services (investment advice and non-
discretionary asset management) and some other 
markets (commodities, more derivatives). 
The degree of detail in MiFID as compared to the ISD is 
considerable. This is to some extent normal, as the MiFID 
harmonises rules on conduct of business which were 
largely left out of the ISD. However, we believe that the 
EU has probably gone too far in its harmonising scope.
3 
Rather than being strictly principles-based, the directive 
has become rules-based for some important provisions, 
resembling a maximum harmonisation directive in some 
parts at least. Measured on the basis of a simple word 
count, and including the implementing measures, the 
directive is almost five times more extensive than the ISD, 
which it replaces.  
The complexity of MiFID, especially its provisions with 
respect to the regulation of broker-dealers, makes it 
difficult for member states and firms to implement all of 
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its provisions in a timely manner. Member states must 
implement the rules by 31 January 2007, but an additional 
delay until 1 November 2007 was granted by the 
Commission for the full application of the rules. The 
European Commission has warned that it will be strict in 
pursuing member states that have not implemented the 
directive on time and properly.
4 However, it is already safe 
to say that several member states will not have 
implemented the rules in time.
5  
To our knowledge, not many systematic surveys have been 
conducted at the firm level on the degree of preparedness 
for MiFID. An extensive survey of investment firms based 
in Germany carried out by the University of Frankfurt 
found that, in early 2006, only 14% of the firms concerned 
were very familiar with the new rules, and only about half 
had started the necessary internal preparations (on a 
sample of 55). Most firms had foreseen the implementation 
in 2007, also from a budgetary perspective. A survey of 
financial institutions Europe-wide by KMPG, carried out 
around the same time, found about the same degree of 
preparation (48% on a sample of 199), and that only 29% 
of the surveyed firms had assigned a project manager. A 
more recent survey carried out for the UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) during the summer of 2006 
continued to find the same degree of preparedness (score 
of 4 out of 10) (LECG, 2006). 
The interesting finding of the first two studies is that 
MiFID is primarily seen as an IT and compliance exercise. 
Surprisingly, less thinking seems to have been invested in 
developing a MiFID strategy across the business. This was 
the main message of the KPMG report, which found a 
blatant lack of awareness in top management on the 
strategic implications of MiFID. The University of 
Frankfurt study found that only 30% of surveyed firms had 
thought about the strategic implications, and among those, 
the theme of ‘best execution’ seemed to be the most 
important. The degree of awareness differs from country to 
country and may result from the fact that some national 
regulators, such as the German BaFin, have given markets 
very little feedback on the national regulatory strategy, 
nature, scope and impact of MiFID implementation. On 
the other hand, others, such as the UK FSA, have been 
very forthcoming and transparent, and have preceded 
national MiFID implementation exercises by extensive 
consultations with the industry.  
                                                        
4 At the Banker Awards Dinner in London on 10 October 
2006, Commissioner Charlie McGreevy remarked that he was 
“very concerned that some Member States have stated 
publicly that they will not be able to transpose MiFID on 
time” and made clear that the Commission “will launch 
immediate infringement procedures against any Member State 
which fails to transpose on time”.  
5 Spain, for one, has already publicly declared it will not be 
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The most wide-ranging findings concern the cost of 
implementation, suggesting considerable confusion and 
little consensus as to the real impact of MiFID. The 
Frankfurt University study comes up with relatively low 
figures, which are proportional to the size of the firm:   
most of the surveyed firms expect compliance costs to 
range from €500,000 to €1 million. Some 16% of firms 
expected costs of between €1 and €5 million and only 4% 
anticipated that costs would exceed €20 million. The 
implementation of the best execution provisions is 
considered the most important cost element. On the other 
hand, in its analysis on the impact of MiFID, JP Morgan 
estimated implementation costs for very large institutions 
to reach €106 million (largely due to IT investments and 
disclosure requirements), with proportionally larger costs 
for the smaller institutions in their sample. The technology 
company Vhayu estimates the cost of compliance to be 
between $6 and $36 million per institution, affecting small 
banks proportionally more.
6 In its cost/benefit analysis, the 
Financial Services Authority estimated that, to be in line 
with the rules on internalisation alone, the cost to dealer 
firms would be between £8 and £40 million (FSA, 2006). 
Another study for the FSA estimated the one-off cost of 
implementation for the UK investment industry, excluding 
internalisation, at £90,000 for small firms, £2.15 million 
for mid-sized firms and £4.75 million for large firms 
(LECG, 2006, p. 67).  
Notwithstanding efforts by the European Commission to 
ensure harmonious implementation, it can be expected that 
‘goldplating’ will continue. The FSA, which is probably 
the most advanced in the implementation exercise, has 
already announced that its rules in two areas will be 
‘super-equivalent’ to the EU rules: consolidation of post-
trade data information and research rules. As regards the 
former, the FSA fears that under the new framework, 
where there is a greater flexibility and choice in permitted 
publication channels, the quality of market data may 
suffer. The FSA has therefore proposed a regime of Trade 
Data Monitors as obligatory venues for trade reporting.  As 
regards research rules, the FSA may seek to retain its rules 
on the use of dealing commissions, which set out which 
kinds of goods and services can be paid for in this way 
(Clifford Chance, 2006). Other member states may face 
difficulties in implementing the entire set of rules, as they 
did not have previous rules on certain activities currently 
governed by MiFID, or what rules did already exist were 
limited. The French ‘Autorité des Marchés Financiers’ 
(AMF), not an example of the lightest regulator in Europe, 
stated in its recent consultation document on best 
execution that “the MiFID best execution requirement is 
far more precise than the existing provisions of the AMF 
General Regulation on the same subject” (AMF, 2006, p. 
4). The European Commission thus faces a heavy task in 
the coming months to live up to its stated intentions. 
Therein lies the contradiction of MiFID: while the 
Commission sells it as a ‘principles-based’ directive, parts 
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of it are heavily rules-based, particularly the provisions 
related to transaction reporting, post-trade transparency 
and other provisions that figure in the Level 2 Regulation. 
At the same time, even regulators such as the FSA that are 
the most favourably disposed to a principles-based 
approach to regulation, grounded in sound market failure 
analysis and regulatory impact assessments, have found it 
difficult to develop a concise code governing conduct-of-
business rules. The FSA’s MiFID rulebook now numbers 
over 500 pages.  
5. Market  impact 
There is a consensus that the biggest impact of MiFID will 
fall on investment firms, and established exchanges will be 
less affected. However, it could be more appropriate to say 
that, in the short term, the impact of MiFID is most likely 
to be felt by investment firms, but in the long term the 
implications of MiFID will likely be more profound for 
exchanges. We expect this result because of the 
combination of internalisation by investment firms and 
increased competition to exchanges from actors in other 
business lines such as data vending, such that the 
traditional business model of established exchanges is 
going to be challenged as never before. Although 
investment firms will initially feel the impact of MiFID 
more directly in terms of the one-off costs associated with 
compliance with the new best execution, systematic 
internalisation, client (re-) classification requirements, 
exchanges will feel an indirect impact as they reposition 
themselves strategically in response to investment firms’ 
and other market participants’ moves. Exchanges may also 
choose not to wait to react to competitive threats but might 
opt instead to anticipate them by taking an aggressive 
proactive approach to the new reality.  
It is curious to note that a radical shift of stance towards 
MiFID has emerged from the City and large financial 
players. Whereas two years ago, MiFID was seen as an 
enemy to be beaten back, today large banks view it not 
only as a fait accompli, but also as an opportunity to be 
seized. The directive is seen not just as incurring costs, but 
also as an important source of new revenues, at least for 
the well-prepared.  
5.1 Investment  firms 
The expectation is that the implementation of MiFID will 
lead to a further consolidation process in the brokerage 
industry. This view does not only emanate from reports of 
analysts and consultants, but also of regulatory authorities, 
such as the FSA. The implementation cost figures, 
mentioned above, are a case in point. In addition, the 
growing complexity of the legislation and the heavy 
compliance are burdens that can hardly be absorbed by 
small brokerage firms, which were widely present in many 
continental European countries until a decade ago. 
Moreover, MiFID could exacerbate the differences 
between the larger and smaller players. Large firms have 
much of the required IT infrastructure and capacity in 
place to deal with MiFID relatively well, whereas the cost The MiFID Revolution| 7 
for smaller firms will be more pronounced (JPMorgan, 
2006, p. 24). However, the surveys of firms in the German 
and British markets (Frankfurt University and LECG) 
imply that the cost factor should not be exaggerated, and 
that it is proportional to the size of the firm. Smaller 
brokers are reported to have said that they have already 
brought their operations in line with many of the 
provisions of the directive, and that they are already 
providing ‘best execution’. The client suitability 
requirements are much easier to implement for smaller 
firms than for large ones, or are already complied with, 
since they know their customers much better, and they do 
not have the same need for expensive computer solutions. 
Hence even if most observers expect consolidation to 
continue, niche players with a strong client focus may 
continue to thrive. 
Very large players are expected to face significant 
compliance costs. A report by JPMorgan analysts expects 
that €19 billion (!) could be wiped off the market 
capitalisation of eight leading European wholesale banks 
as a result of MiFID. This effect is predicted to be driven 
by a mixture of increased competition (lower profits) and 
the costs of implementing the detailed client suitability 
arrangements, higher transparency and strict best-
execution requirements resulting from MiFID. The JP 
Morgan analysts expect the directive to above all represent 
a threat to the integrated banking model, whereby the retail 
distribution network will subsidise the investment banking 
division to a lesser extent as a result of outsourcing to 
cheaper third-party providers. The loss of captive private 
banking volumes (i.e. private banking trades which are 
executed on the investment bank’s internal platform) is 
expected to lead to a 20% decline in margins.   
To what extent will banks internalise? We would maintain 
that, because of the constraints on internalisation and the 
associated costs for banks to implement it, systematic 
internalisation, as defined by the directive, will remain 
limited. The JP Morgan study estimates that the potential 
savings of an internal exchange would be just 2% of the 
overall cost of trading. This result is based on the 
assumption that 20% of trades are settled internally, 
whereas most large banks settle a maximum of 5% of 
trades internally today. Exchanges are therefore expected 
to remain the main source of liquidity for equity shares. 
However, the trades to which the rules on systematic 
internalisers apply are limited to retail trades in some 500 
blue chip shares, and hence a bank that is dealing above a 
retail market size is not bound by the rules.
7 While 
internalisation was already tolerated in markets such as 
Germany and the UK, it was not allowed, or only allowed 
to a (very) limited extent, in France, Italy, Spain and (to a 
lesser extent) the Netherlands. If, after the removal of the 
concentration rule, these exchanges are seen to be 
inefficient or to charge excessive fees, they could rapidly 
                                                        
7 The systematic internalisation requirements apply to trades 
below the ‘standard market size threshold’, i.e. the average of 
the value of retail trade transactions. 
lose market share in these countries once their effective 
monopolies are ended. Apart from challenging exchanges 
on trading activities, internalising banks are no longer 
requested to pass the trade information obtained on to the 
exchanges for publication. Under MiFID, they are free to 
publish data reports through a Multilateral Trading Facility 
or a data vendor instead of an exchange if they so prefer.  
The complexity of the regulatory regime will certainly 
drive firms to look into alternatives. The regime for 
investment fund companies (UCITS III), which was 
adopted in 2002, introduced the single license for fund 
management companies, broadening the 1985 UCITS 
product directive. It is a valuable although more 
constrained alternative than MiFID. It grants the ‘single 
license’ to fund management companies in the broad sense 
of the word, allowing the management of investment 
funds, the ‘core services’, but also other forms of portfolio 
management, such as pension funds for individuals, 
investment advice, safekeeping (custody) and 
administration of investment funds, which are seen as 
‘non-core’ or ancillary. However, elements of MiFID, such 
as the increased transparency, best execution and cost 
unbundling could also spill over into the UCITS regime, 
which is currently under review.
8 Whether MiFID would 
also lead member states to create new non-passportable 
regimes, as was done under the 2003 Prospectus Directive, 
is also a possibility, albeit a rather theoretical one at this 
stage. 
5.2 Exchanges 
The regulatory changes resulting from MiFID are less 
profound at the outset for exchanges than investment 
firms. Apart from tighter organisational and governance 
requirements, the regime does not change that much from 
the ISD. However, two developments will have an 
important direct impact on European exchanges: 1) the 
increased competition on the trade information side from 
other channels and 2) the impact of the ECB and EU 
initiatives on the settlement side. In addition, there is the 
impact of the market developments in the investment firms 
industry, described above, and the competition from 
Multilateral Trading Facilities, which can compete with 
exchanges for order flow. 
Traditionally, exchanges were the predominant, almost 
exclusive source of market data, not least due to the 
concentration of trading and data reporting imposed by 
regulatory authorities. With this breakdown will come 
increased opportunities for investment firms to recapture 
revenue streams that were originally generated by their 
orders. The aggregate pan-European market for market 
                                                        
8 Directive 2001/107/EC amending Council Directive 
85/611/ECC relating to undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (UCITS), with a view to regulating 
management companies and simplified prospectuses, OJ L41 
of 13/02/02. 8 | Casey & Lannoo 
data is estimated at about €2.3 billion per year.
9 This 
sizeable revenue pool is up for grabs by innovative firms 
and other financial market actors.  
Investment firms have not been slow on the uptake. 
Already, a group of nine London-based investment banks 
have set up a joint effort called ‘Project Boat’, which is 
intended to capture back data revenue sources from trades 
where investment firms – and not the exchange – were the 
liquidity providers/facilitators. Prior to MiFID, investment 
firms paid exchanges a fee to report OTC trades, only to 
buy back the collated and repackaged information from 
information providers against a fee. This odd situation 
squeezed investment firm margins on both the revenue and 
cost sides. By opening up the architecture for trade 
reporting, MiFID will challenge an important revenue 
source for exchanges and provide a valuable opportunity 
for investment firms to get in on the game. Even self-
regulatory bodies such as the International Capital Markets 
Association (ICMA) are positioning themselves to use 
existing engines and technology to tap some of this 
expected revenue stream. 
Income from the sale of trade information today accounts 
for about 12% of the revenue of the six largest exchanges 
in the EU. For some exchanges, it is much higher, reaching 
32.3% for the London Stock Exchange (although in this 
case the figure also includes revenues from regulatory 
information services). Although the usefulness of the trade 
information gathered by exchanges is closely related to the 
degree to which exchanges are the main source of 
liquidity, the competition from new facilities or from data 
vendors, resulting from the ‘open architecture’ for market 
data introduced by the directive, may form a direct threat 
to this revenue stream for exchanges. Hence, the combined 
effect of more internalisation by investment firms or more 
trades routed through MTFs could have a direct impact on 
the completeness of the trade information that exchanges 
collect and sell. 
Exchange participation fees (commissions) will also come 
under pressure with the proliferation of execution venues 
and the breakdown of the traditional national trading 
environment. So will trading fees, which currently account 
for about 45% of the largest European stock exchange 
revenues on average (see van Steenis et al.). Exchanges 
will not only face more competition from liquidity 
providers, but also from other exchanges, who can 
compete for liquidity in equities that are not necessarily 
cross-listed in their home market. For example, the SWX 
Swiss Exchange launched a ‘sponsored segment’, in July 
2005, whereby Swiss Exchange members can trade 
foreign-listed equities on the SWX, even if these securities 
are not cross-listed on the SWX. 
 
                                                        
9 “Wall Street and Technology: MiFID Rules Break the 
Exchange Monopoly on Trade Reporting”, 20 October 2006 
(www.wstonline.com). 
Figure 3. European stock exchanges revenue decomposed 
by activity 
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Source: Stock Exchanges Annual Report 2005.
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The threat to the revenue that exchanges earn from 
settlement services may be even more severe, at least for 
the vertically-integrated exchanges. Art. 46 of MiFID 
requires clearing and settlement facilities to provide direct 
access to regulated markets from other member states. In 
itself, this article may not change much, as a similar 
provision already existed in the ISD, and vertically 
integrated exchanges are already providing direct access. 
However, to the extent that MiFID allows internalisation, 
it may lead to settlement occurring on platforms other than 
that of the exchange. In addition, MTF’s can obtain a 
European passport and settle where it is most cost-
effective. Vertically-integrated exchanges may be 
protected from some of these pressures as it will be 
difficult to organise settlement outside the home country of 
the securities issuer, because of the need for specific local 
company- and tax-law expertise. 
The main question in settlement revolves around the 
impact of initiatives by the ECB and the EU on post-
trading. The European Commission has proposed a code of 
conduct for settlement providers to improve price 
transparency in, and ease of access to C&S (clearing and 
settlement) systems. The code requests providers to 
unbundle pricing and accounting of C&S activities. It 
allows C&S firms to offer their services on a pan-
European basis. Although the code has not yet entered into 
force, some have already stated that it will spell the 
beginning of the end for the vertically-integrated exchange 
model. 
As regards the ECB initiative, it is again too early to say 
how far-reaching it will be and how likely it is to affect the 
activities of settlement providers. In principle, the ECB 
will only provide settlement against central bank money 
for euro-denominated government bonds or assets eligible 
for Eurosystem credit operations (meaning in practice all 
euro-denominated securities), but it will not manage 
corporate actions. This will, as the ECB indicated itself, 
“eliminate the need for any other settlement platform for 
securities transactions denominated in euro at CSD level” 
(Godeffroy, 2006). Although local C&S may continue to 
provide STP (straight-through processing), and settle in the 
end on the Target 2 securities platform, there will be no 
technical justification to do so. The creation of a monopoly The MiFID Revolution| 9 
for settlement of euro-denominated securities will, 
according to the ECB, lead to post-market integration and 
to the exploitation of scale economies. This initiative could 
potentially have a serious detrimental impact on the 
settlement income of vertically-integrated exchanges and 
bond settlement platforms, and it may further harm them 
by leading banks to reconsider their relations with these 
entities for corporate actions as well, where custodians will 
try to win more market share. 
Nevertheless, exchanges may generate further revenue 
streams post-MiFID, namely in IT and consulting. 
However contradictory it may sound, exchanges may sell 
in-house matching services to banks, and in this sense try 
to keep control on internalisation and the related 
technology. As banks may not have the in-house IT 
expertise to become systematic internalisers, exchanges’ 
IT departments may offer their services in the market. 
Euronext is said to have already engaged in talks with 
banks to this effect.  
Exchanges could also establish MTFs to facilitate the 
execution of unwieldy or complex trades that are unfit for 
entry into electronic order books and which users might 
prefer to negotiate ‘off-market’ instead of in an ‘upstairs’ 
negotiated deal – thereby coming under less stringent 
disclosure requirements than those which apply to ‘on-
exchange’ deals; or they may do so simply to cater to 
specific niches in the market. Exchanges could also benefit 
from increased trade transparency requirements in OTC 
markets or the ‘exchangisation’ of certain market segments 
that were heretofore essentially OTC. This trend is clearly 
ongoing in the bond and investment fund markets and 
gives exchanges a chance to compete where previously 
there was little opportunity to do so.   
Estimating the competitive threat MTFs will pose to 
exchanges is a difficult exercise at this stage. Much will 
depend on the response of exchanges to MiFID and their 
ability to further improve their efficiency in the form of 
lower fees, better price formation processes and improved 
infrastructure, as resulted for example from the creation of 
Euronext (Pagano & Padilla, 2005). Do these challenges 
therefore portend a further consolidation amongst 
exchanges?  It will be important in the coming months and 
years to find the right balance between consolidation and 
competition in a sector that already today is highly 
concentrated. The four largest EU exchanges control 84% 
of equity turnover and 93% if the largest five players are 
considered. MTFs may be a useful tool to ensure that 
markets do not become too concentrated. MTFs may also 
enjoy a competitive edge in specific markets or business 
segments of exchanges, such as the market for new high-
growth or high-tech firms, or for the reporting of trading 
data, as discussed above. The traditional exchanges will 
thus need to be extremely attentive in the months to come. 
Exchanges in the new member states will face a particular 
set of challenges. The large markets – Poland, Czech 
Republic and Hungary – all have a concentration rule in 
place. There is little threat for them that local banks will 
begin siphoning off liquidity by setting themselves up as 
systematic internalisers. Their capacity to do so is limited 
by scarce technological resources and by the difficulty to 
overcome the first-mover advantages enjoyed by 
exchanges in a culture where liquidity has always been 
exchange-driven. The real threat for these exchanges will 
come from MiFID-induced competition from powerful 
foreign exchanges and large foreign banks operating out of 
the City of London or Frankfurt to the more liquid and 
larger domestic companies. Nevertheless, these exchanges 
do have the advantage that the investor base remains 
overwhelmingly local, which are essentially the large and 
growing pension and investment funds, which still face 
strict investment limits in foreign securities as a result of 
currency matching rules, for example. Because liquidity is 
concentrated in the hands of regional investors, for whom 
trading costs are lower when routed through the local 
exchange, the scale of the threat is limited for the moment. 
However, this may change over time. If it does, and if data 
vending revenues fall as a result, the main exchanges in the 
new member states may be forced to consolidate forces 
with larger exchanges elsewhere in Europe in order to 
survive.
10 
5.3  Advisory firms and solution providers 
Because MiFID’s conduct-of-business rules are detailed, 
buy-side firms may have the impression that MiFID’s 
obligations are essentially geared towards sell-side 
institutions. This is a mistaken impression. There seems to 
be a considerable lack of understanding among buy-side 
firms that MiFID has important implications for the way 
they too conduct their business. A recent study by EdHec 
Risk Advisory (2006) suggests that up to 40% of buy-side 
firms plan to invest no more than €25,000 per year on best-
execution arrangements and technologies, suggesting a 
surprising lack of preparedness among buy-side firms for 
post-MiFID challenges relating to the search for, and 
verification of, best execution for their clients. 
Like law and advisory firms, business-solutions providers 
are sure to be key winners from MiFID implementation as 
all market participants seek to cope with a vastly more 
complex trading landscape. Algorithmic trading is one of 
those solutions, and as such, it represents one of the 
ongoing market trends that we identified earlier in this 
paper and that are likely to be reinforced or accelerated 
once MiFID is implemented. The predicted increase in 
algorithmic trading will be driven by both demand- and 
supply-side forces.   
On the demand side, pressure on firms to rely more on 
algorithms post-MiFID will come from the regulatory 
provisions related to execution obligations. MiFID 
establishes a requirement that investment firms develop a 
best-execution policy which is occasionally tested by the 
investment firm for robustness. In this way, a firm’s clients 
will know ex-ante the criteria against which an executed 
                                                        
10 We are grateful to Slawomir Pycko, Deputy Director for 
Planning and Business development at the Warsaw Stock 
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trade will be judged ‘best’, thereby helping to hold 
investment firms accountable when the quality of 
execution is doubtful. For two reasons, algorithmic trading 
systems are probably the most reliable way for investment 
firms to ensure they have effective best-execution policy in 
place. First, they can be programmed to hunt for the best 
prices across a wide range of execution venues in mere 
fractions of a second; secondly, the parameters that govern 
the way the algorithm hunts for a ‘best’ result and the 
definition of that ‘best’ result (i.e., price/cost, speed of 
execution, market impact, or any linear combination of 
these or other criteria) are set ex-ante by the algorithm 
developers (and/or traders, depending on how flexible the 
system is). The smart order-routing systems merely seek to 
optimise the given algorithm. The fact that an algorithm is 
based on set, predetermined parameters leads to a clear and 
transparent presentation of the firm’s execution strategy 
ex-ante, so that the firm’s clients are duly informed of the 
criteria used to assess execution venues and route orders. 
At the same time, consumers can be more confident about 
execution results, since the algorithm carries out the 
optimisation in a purely mechanical predetermined 
manner: intelligent systems, unlike real traders, do not face 
conflicts of interest and merely carry out trades in a 
disinterested manner as a function of the inputs. 
As for the supply-side forces, the vast amount of 
previously unavailable market data that MiFID will 
generate through more stringent transparency requirements 
and through the proliferation of execution venues is likely 
to enhance the development and refinement of algorithmic 
solutions, whose performance often depends in great part 
on the volume of high-quality data available. The increase 
of market data will enable new and next-generation 
algorithms to be developed, stimulating demand in 
response to innovation.  
Algorithms today do not account for a large percentage of 
trades in volume terms. A recent survey of European buy-
side firms indicated that they accounted for only 3% of 
trades, compared to 11% carried out via direct market 
access (e.g. multi-dealer-to-client platforms, or B2C), 17% 
via programme trading and 69% in traditional cash 
transactions (see Cooper, 2006). Despite this low figure, 
the growth rate of algorithmic trading has been brisk, and 
we predict it will increase significantly in the post-MiFID 
landscape. A recent survey conducted by IBM even claims 
that 90% of traders in Europe will lose their jobs to 
algorithms by 2015, although this figure seems very high 
to us (see IBM, 2006b). Nevertheless, it is a real possibility 
that as the quality, flexibility and performance of 
algorithms rise, trading in liquid securities will likely 
involve fewer human traders in future. 
As greater transparency is introduced into the marketplace 
and as the speed at which new information is impounded 
into prices increases, the market impact of block trades has 
increased. Because of the increasing costs transparency 
imposes on block trades, eligible counterparties and 
institutional investors that are trying to offload large 
positions have been led to seek greater recourse to 
programme trades, which parcel up blocks into smaller 
tickets to minimise market impact. It is therefore not 
surprising that one observes a progressive fall in the size of 
trading tickets in European equity markets as greater post-
transparency is introduced into the market.  
Finally, in terms of overall market impact, another benefit 
of smart order execution/routing, whether algorithmic- or 
programme-based, is that it is likely to enhance both the 
speed and the quality of price discovery, thereby 
improving market efficiency.  
Apart from buy-side firms, a number of sell-side solutions 
providers can be expected to gain from MiFID, including 
data vendors and data consolidators/disseminators, 
connectivity solutions providers, data management 
providers, and others who will benefit from the enormous 
market for market data that is likely to result from MiFID. 
6. Outlook 
Whether MiFID brings another ten years of growth in 
Europe’s securities markets is of course difficult to predict. 
But it certainly brings more competition in securities 
markets and will substantially change the market 
environment. Trading volumes can be expected to further 
increase as a result of greater competition between 
execution venues and enhanced market transparency. As 
Europe’s capital markets become further integrated and the 
nationality of firms becomes less clear, exchanges will be 
in more direct competition with each other for the blue 
chips. In addition, their business model will be challenged 
on the trade information and settlement side.  
The requirements on investment firms to provide best 
execution and to unbundle their fees for securities 
transactions should, in addition to other directives adopted 
under the FSAP, stimulate the confidence of retail 
investors and increase their participation in securities 
markets. Transaction fees should decline, and disclosure 
further improve. The MiFID Revolution| 11 
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